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Contact theory and conflict theory offer sharply conflicting predictions about the 
effects of interethnic exposure on prejudice. Contact theory predicts that close 
collaborative contact under conditions of equal status causes a reduction in inter-
ethnic prejudice. By contrast, conflict theory predicts that shallow or competitive 
exposure causes an increase in inter-ethnic antipathy. Both theories are backed by 
rigorous field-experimental evidence. However, much of this evidence tests each 
theory under arguably extreme conditions. Therefore, the boundaries of the scope 
conditions for contact and conflict theory remain unclear: where is the line between 
close versus shallow, or collaborative versus competitive, inter-ethnic exposures? We 
test the consequences of inter-ethnic exposure in a natural and non-extreme setting 
by executing a large, well-powered, and pre-registered randomized field experiment 
on inter-ethnic discrimination in 40 Hungarian schools. We show that neither 
manipulating the closeness of interethnic contact within classrooms, nor variation in 
inter-ethnic exposure across classrooms, has an effect on non- Roma students' inter-
ethnic discrimination. These findings suggest that inter-ethnic contact may be neutral 
with respect to discrimination in many everyday settings, thus failing both to fulfill 
the hopes of contact theory and to actualize the concerns of conflict theory. 
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A kontaktus és a konfliktus elméletek egymásnak ellentmondó előrejelzéseket tesznek az 
inter-etnikus kontaktusok előítéletességre gyakorolt hatásáról. A kontaktus elmélet szerint az 
egyenlő státusú felek közötti szoros és együttműködő kapcsolatok csökkentik az etnikai 
előítéleteket. Ezzel szemben a konfliktus elmélet úgy véli, hogy a felszínes és versengő 
kapcsolatok fokozzák az inter-etnikus ellenszenvet. Mindkét elméletet rigorózus 
terepkísérletek egész sora támasztja alá. Ezek a terepkísérletek azonban vitathatatlanul 
szélsőséges körülmények között tesztelik az egyes elméleteket. Ezért a kontaktus és a 
konfliktus elméletek hatókörének határai továbbra sem tisztázottak. Keveset tudunk arról, 
hogy hol van a határ a szoros és a felszínes valamint az együttműködő és a versengő inter-
etnikus kapcsolatoknak való kitettség között. Kutatásunkban az inter-etnikus környezetnek 
való kitettséget természetes és nem szélsőséges körülmények között vizsgáljuk. Egy 
nagymintás, előregisztrált terepkísérletet végeztünk az etnikai előítéletesség témakörében 40 
magyar általános iskolában. Megmutatjuk, hogy sem az inter-etnikus kapcsolatok 
közelségének osztályon belüli manipulálása, sem pedig az inter-etnikus kapcsolatoknak való 
kitettség osztályok közötti váltakozása nincsen hatással a nem-Roma tanulók etnikai 
előítéletességére. Mindez azt sugallja, hogy az inter-etnikus kapcsolatok a legtöbb hétköznapi 
szituációban minden bizonnyal nincsenek hatással az előítéletességre. Az inter-etnikus 
kapcsolatoknak való kitettség így nem teljesíti be sem a kontaktus elmélet által keltett 
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Contact theory and conflict theory offer sharply conflicting predictions about the effects of 
interethnic exposure on prejudice. Contact theory predicts that close collaborative contact under 
conditions of equal status causes a reduction in inter-ethnic prejudice. By contrast, conflict 
theory predicts that shallow or competitive exposure causes an increase in inter-ethnic 
antipathy. Both theories are backed by rigorous field-experimental evidence. However, much of 
this evidence tests each theory under arguably extreme conditions. Therefore, the boundaries of 
the scope conditions for contact and conflict theory remain unclear: where is the line between 
close versus shallow, or collaborative versus competitive, inter-ethnic exposures? We test the 
consequences of inter-ethnic exposure in a natural and non-extreme setting by executing a large, 
well-powered, and pre-registered randomized field experiment on inter-ethnic discrimination in 
40 Hungarian schools. We show that neither manipulating the closeness of interethnic contact 
within classrooms, nor variation in inter-ethnic exposure across classrooms, has an effect on non-
Roma students' inter-ethnic discrimination.  These findings suggest that inter-ethnic contact may 
be neutral with respect to discrimination in many everyday settings, thus failing both to fulfill the 
hopes of contact theory and to actualize the concerns of conflict theory. 
 
                                                          
* Acknowledgements:  We thank Henning Finseraas and Åshild Johnsen for valuable comments. This study was 
reviewed and approved by the IRB offices at the Hungarian Academy of Science and at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison. The research has been funded by Tamás Keller's grant from the National Research, Development and 
Innovation Office (NKFIH), Grant number: FK 125358, the Research Council of Norway (project 287766 ``Field 
Experiments to Identify the Effects and Scope Conditions of Social Interactions"), and Vilas Associate Award from 




Whether ethnic intermingling exacerbates or diminishes ethnic tensions is a pressing question of 
our time. Social science presents sharply different predictions for the effects of interethnic 
exposure.  On one hand, contact theory (Allport 1954) predicts that deep and cooperative 
interethnic exposure promotes understanding, reduces prejudice, and increases interethnic 
trust. On the other hand, conflict and group threat theories (Blalock 1967; Bobo 1999; Williams 
1964) predict that shallow or competitive exposure spurs exclusionary attitudes on the part of 
the ethnic majority toward their ethnic others. Constrict theory (Putnam 2007), a variant of 
conflict theory, additionally posits that interethnic exposure can weaken in-group solidarity 
among the majority group.  
 These contrasting theoretical predictions beg the question of scope conditions (Paluck et 
al. 2019). When does interethnic contact promote trust, and when does it promote prejudice? 
Building on Allport’s (1954) classical formulation, over time, social scientists have endorsed an 
increasingly expansive interpretation of the scope conditions for contact theory, reporting 
positive effects not only for prolonged cooperative exposure but also for indirect contact via mass 
media and friends of friends (Pettigrew et al. 2011). Perhaps buoyed by this confidence, “the 
promotion of intergroup contact has arguably become the foremost strategy for reducing 
prejudice" (Paluck et al. 2019:130).  
At least three reasons, however, caution against expansive policy hopes for contact 
theory. The first concern is selection bias. The great majority of supportive research is cross-
sectional and observational, i.e. compares individuals who, at least in part, self-select into, or out 
of, intergroup contact. It is reasonable to expect that individuals who choose to expose 
 
themselves to ethnic others are less prejudiced against them in the first place.  Separating 
selection on ex-ante predispositions from the causal effects of the resulting interethnic contact 
on attitudes and behavior is difficult (Morgan and Winship 2005).  The methodological consensus 
in sociology is that causal claims are most credible when they are backed by field experimental 
evidence that eliminates selection bias through randomization (Baldassari and Abascal 2017).  
The second concern is impact. Compared to the estimates of observational studies, 
randomized field experiments have generally found smaller—and often much smaller—positive 
effects of intergroup contact (see Paluck et al. 2019 for a review). Furthermore, larger 
experiments report smaller effects, as do experiments that curtail specification searches by 
following pre-registered analysis plans (Paluck et al. 2019). These regularities suggest publication 
bias in favor of studies that support contact theory, even among randomized experiments.1 
The third concern is generalizability: the randomized field experiments that most strongly 
support contact theory were conducted not only under favorable, but arguably under extreme 
conditions. Ten of the 24 randomized field experiments supporting contact theory in Paluck et 
al.’s (2019) comprehensive review study the effects of enforced coresidence among a highly 
selected population of relative strangers. To wit, research demonstrates conclusively that 
interethnic exposure promotes inclusionary attitudes and behaviors when members of different 
ethnic groups are forced to live together in elite college dorms (Boisjoly et al. 2006), the military 
(Finseraas and Kotsadam 2017), or elite military college dorms (Carell et al. 2015). Clearly, if the 
positive effects of interethnic contact on interethnic relations hinged on coresidence, the policy 
potential of contact theory would be limited (Paluck and Green 2009).  
Together, these concerns raise the question of when, and to what extent, interventions 
 
that promote intergroup contact diminish intergroup discrimination, especially when these 
interventions occur in mundane, and hence scalable, conditions.  
In this study, we test the predictions of the contact, conflict, and constrict theories under 
quotidian and scalable conditions. Rather than intervening on coresidence among former 
strangers in elite colleges or the military, we randomize the seating chart in 186 public-school 
classrooms in Hungary. We conduct two experiments: A vignette experiment to measure 
discrimination, and a field experiment that randomizes the seating chart of 186 classrooms in 39 
Hungarian schools for the duration of one semester. This allows us to investigate whether close 
interethnic contact, defined by sitting next to a deskmate belonging to the Roma ethnic minority 
affects outgroup discrimination and outgroup-friendships among members of the non-Roma 
Hungarian majority.  
 Our study differs from previous randomized evaluations of contact theory in several ways. 
First, our intervention has the potential of universal scalability, since, in contrast to college or 
military service, almost all members of a birth cohort must attend school. Second, our 
intervention has a light touch. Rather than intervening in individuals’ living arrangements, which 
most people regard a prerogative of intimate personal choice, we intervene in classroom seating 
charts, which are routinely set by teachers. Third, we study a well-established natural setting. 
Rather than inducing coresidence between strangers in a new environment (college freshmen or 
military recruits), we reseat 3rd through 8th grade students who have grown up in the same small 
towns and have attended school together for at least 2 years prior to the intervention. Fourth, 
to our knowledge, this study is by far the largest randomized field experiment of interethnic 
contact, involving N=3,184 students. Fifth, unlike most field experiments on interethnic contact 
 
(Paluck et al. 2019) our study was pre-registered and closely adheres to a pre-analysis plan.2  
 The results of our study are unambiguous. Our randomized vignette experiment documents 
substantial discrimination against Roma children among non-Roma children in our sample. The 
probability that a non-Roma student would lend money to a classmate is reduced by 27 percent 
if that classmate is described as Roma. But our field experimental findings fail to lend support to any 
of the main theories of inter-ethnic exposure. First, they plainly disappoint the hopes raised by 
contact theory, as being randomly assigned to a Roma deskmate for an entire semester does not 
affect the ethnic majority’s discrimination against Roma students. Indeed, being randomly 
assigned to a Roma deskmate does not even lead to a higher probability of having a Roma friend. 
Second, in contrast to conflict theory, we do not find that exposure to a Roma deskmate leads to 
fewer friendships or more discrimination against Roma. Third, in contrast to constrict theory, we 
find no evidence that exposure to Roma deskmates reduces intra-ethnic lending among non-
Roma Hungarians. 
Our Null results are decidedly informative, i.e. they are not due to a lack of statistical power or 
inadvertent averaging of heterogeneous effects. All estimates are closely centered around the Null 
hypothesis of no effect, and there is little indication of effect heterogeneity based on students’ own 
characteristics, their deskmates’ characteristics, or classroom characteristics, such as grades and 
gender. In other words, our Null results do not present lack of evidence for an effect, but evidence for 
the lack of an effect.  
Supplementary analyses also rule out that classroom level exposure to Roma students reduce 
discrimination. We show this using a quasi-experimental approach that exploits plausibly exogenous 
variation in the number of Roma students across classrooms (or across grades) within schools 
 
(Hoxby 2000). While the number of inter-ethnic friendships increases with the share of Roma 
students in the classroom, the magnitude of discrimination is unaffected. Hence, these results 
suggest that neither desk- nor classroom-level contact with ethnic minorities ameliorates (or 
exacerbates) out-group discrimination among the ethnic majority. In other words, neither contact 
nor conflict theory apply. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews prior work on 
interethnic exposure with a particular focus on field experiments and scope conditions; Section 
3 describes the experimental design; Section 4 describes the data; Section 5 the method; 
Sections 6 presents the field experimental results; and 7 present quasi-experimental results. 
Section 8 discusses our findings and concludes.   
2 Previous findings and scope conditions 
The literature on the effects of interethnic exposure divides into two main perspectives: contact 
theory and conflict theory. According to contact theory, close and cooperative contact, under 
scope conditions detailed below, can reduce prejudice and increase trust (Allport, 1954). Such 
exposures may diminish interethnic animosity by fostering empathy, increasing understanding, 
normalizing or habituating otherness, and promoting friendship. By contrast, conflict theory 
posits that animosity across groups is worsened with shallow or competitive exposure (Blalock 
1967; Williams 1964). Such exposures may worsen outcomes by virtue of lacking the depth to 
promote understanding and empathy so that the categorical otherness of the interaction 
partners dominates to activate aversion and perception of threat. Putnam’s (2007) constrict 
theory adds to the conflict perspective by arguing that inter-ethnic exposure may also undermine 
in-group trust.  
The canonic treatment of interest in these theories is the co-location of members of 
 
different ethnic groups in the same space. The wider (especially interventionist) literature on 
inter-group relations sometimes additionally evaluates bundled treatments that combine 
interventions on co-location with mandatory perspective-taking exercises on race or ethnic 
relations (e.g. Sorensen 2010; Markowicz 2009). We sidestep such bundled treatments and focus 
on the effects of co-location under various scope conditions. 
Contact theory is supported by hundreds of observational, and mostly cross-sectional, 
studies (see e.g., Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, Pettigrew et al. 2011 for reviews), and also by a 
smaller number of randomized field experiments. We found 8 randomized field experiments 
involving interracial or interethnic exposures (Boisjoly et al., 2006; Burns et al., 2016;  Camargo 
et al 2010; Carrell et al., 2019;  Green and Wong, 2009; Finseraas and Kotsadam, 2017; Finseraas 
et al. 2019;  Page-Gould et al. 2008). Most field experiments that support positive effects of 
interethnic contacts evaluate arguably extreme interventions that enforce prolonged 
coresidence of young adults in college dorms or military bootcamps (Boisjoly et al., 2006; Burns 
et al., 2016; Carrell et al., 2019;  Finseraas and Kotsadam, 2017; Finseraas et al. 2019;  Camargo 
et al 2010). For example, Boisjoly et al. (2006) found that random assignment to African American 
roommates at a selective U.S. university increased white students’ support for affirmative action. 
Carrell et al. (2019) found that assignment to African American roommates at the United States 
Air Force Academy increased white students’ requests for African American roommates in 
subsequent years. Finseraas and Kotsadam (2017) found that random assignment to ethnic-
minority roommates during boot camp improved Norwegian army recruits’ opinion of 
immigrants’ work ethic. In a similar spirit, Green and Wong (2009) find that white high-school 
students developed greater out-group tolerance after random assignment to racial or ethnic 
 
others during a three-week long outdoor survival course. 
Far fewer field experiments evaluate the consequences of contact with ethnic others 
under less extreme conditions.  Page-Gould et al. (2008) evaluate a friendship building exercise 
that randomly paired white and Latinx college students during three one-hour meetings. They 
find no evidence of interethnic contact on initiating cross-group interactions 10 days after the 
end of the intervention on average, but they do report statistically significant positive effects for 
students with high initial prejudice. Yet other experiments report positive effects of contact 
between groups defined by categories arguably related to ethnicity, such as assignment to 
members of different castes in Indian cricket teams (Lowe 2020) or assignment of Christians and 
Muslims to vocational training courses in Nigeria (Scacco and Warren 2018) or to soccer teams 
in Iraq (Mousa 2020). Rao (2019) investigates in group bias in Indian schools and find that wealthy 
students discriminate poor students less after exposure.  
Like contact theory, conflict theory is supported by numerous observational, and mostly 
cross-sectional, studies (e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Delhey and Newton, 2005; Dinesen and 
Sønderskov, 2015; Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston, 2018; Legewie and Scheffer 2016), and also by 
some recent field-experimental evidence. For example, in a quasi-experimental study exploiting 
demographic changes in Chicago neighborhoods following the demolition of large public housing 
complexes, Enos (2016) found that voter turnout and the vote share for conservative candidates 
decreased sharply among whites as African American neighbors moved away. Yet more strikingly, 
in one of the few randomized field experiments on the topic, Enos (2014) found that randomly 
placing Spanish-speaking individuals at commuter train stations in Boston significantly increased 
exclusionary attitudes toward immigrants among white passengers. 
 
Constrict theory, as a variant of conflict theory, currently lacks support from high-quality 
evidence. Putnam, (2007) based constrict theory on the observation that less ethnically diverse 
neighborhoods in the United States have higher levels of in-group trust among whites. However, 
more ethnically diverse U.S. neighborhoods are not only less white, but also poorer and less 
stable than more ethnically homogenous neighborhoods (Abascal and Baldassarri 2015; Meer 
and Tolsma 2014). It is difficult to disentangle the effect of ethnic diversity on trust from the 
effects of poverty, residential mobility, and other, potentially unmeasured, correlates of diverse 
locales in observational studies. The only randomized field experiment testing constrict theory 
(Finseraas et al. 2019) fails to support it. 
The apparently disparate—positive and negative—effects of inter-ethnic contact are 
generally reconciled by different scope conditions for contact and conflict theory (e.g. Abascal 
and Baldassarri 2015; Dinesen and Sønderskov 2015; and Valdez 2014). In Allport’s (1954) 
classical formulation of contact theory, interethnic contact will promote positive intergroup 
relations when (i) contact is supported by an authority and both groups (ii) share equal status and 
(iii) cooperate (iv) in the pursuit of common goals. Subsequent research additionally emphasized 
the importance of (v) close and prolonged interactions (e.g., Finseraas and Kotsadam 2017) and 
(vi) friendship potential among the interacting individuals (e.g., Pettigrew, 1998; Laurence, 2009;  
Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston, 2008; Van Laar et al., 2005). The scope conditions for conflict theory 
include (i) fleeting, shallow, and non-repeated exposures (Enos 2014), or (ii) exposures occurring 
when in-group and out-group members manifestly compete over scarce resources, social rights, 
and social status (e.g. Bobo 1999; Semyonov et al. 2006), or (iii) exposures to out-group members 
that are perceived to pose economic or cultural threats (Blalock, 1967; Williams, 1964; Bobo 
 
1999; McLaren, 2003; Valdez, 2014).  
The scope conditions for both theories are vague. For contact theory, it is unclear how 
close is close enough; what characterizes friendship potential; and in what sense equal status is 
even possible in societies where the majority oppresses the minority. Regarding conflict theory: 
when do individuals not compete over some resource, and when can analysts exclude the 
possibility of perceived cultural threat? These problems are multiplied if each scope condition 
has to be evaluated along multiple dimensions: cooperation vs. competition with respect to 
multiple goals; status with respect to multiple criteria. Furthermore, even if individual scope 
conditions are unambiguously met, it is unclear to what extent scope conditions can trade off 
against each other: does enthusiastic cooperation in pursuit of a single overriding common goal 
make up for status inequality or perceived cultural threat?  
The unavoidable conclusion is that most real-world settings do not constitute ideal-typical 
matches for either theory. This is not to say that those settings do not exist. For example, 
Norwegian military bootcamps may be considered well-nigh obvious settings for contact theory 
(Finseraas and Kotsadam 2017), because multiethnic teams spend most of their days pursuing 
externally mandated group goals that are evaluated at the team level, cooperation is enforced 
by drill sergeants, and equal status within teams is a stated policy of the military, symbolically 
manifested by identical rank, pay, and uniforms. By contrast, even in college dorms, which are 
the most common setting for field experiments on contact theory, one might wonder to what 
extent roommates necessarily cooperate in the pursuit of a common goal, rather than, say, fight 
over space and quiet hours.  
This theoretical ambiguity triggers practical concerns for policy. While the field 
 
experimental evidence demonstrates that contact can reduce prejudice, it also demonstrates 
that contact can increase prejudice. Absent unambiguous, let alone exhaustive, scope conditions, 
it is very difficult to defend ex-ante expectations about the effects of contact in new settings. This 
is a problem inasmuch as promoting interethnic contact is a popular strategy for improving 
interethnic relations in new settings where the effects of contact have not yet been evaluated. 
We take the view that the labor of refining the scope conditions of contact and conflict theory 
must take the form of building an expansive evidence base that evaluates germane interventions 
in new settings with dependable research designs. 
 
3. Setting and Expectations 
3.1. Setting 
We test the effects of interethnic exposure on interethnic friendships and discrimination in 186 
3rd through 8th grade classrooms of 39 schools in rural Hungary. Hungary is an ethnically 
homogenous country in which the Roma ethnic minority experiences a high degree of 
discrimination. The Roma are Hungary’s largest ethnic minority, comprising 3 percent of the total 
population, and 12 percent of Hungarian youth. Many Roma speak the Romani language in 
addition to Hungarian; and many are recognizable by appearance to non-Roma Hungarians 
(Kertesi and Kézdi, 2011b). Roma people suffer severe economic, social, and health disadvantages 
and are frequent targets of bullying, prejudice, and discrimination (Kertesi and Kezdi 2011a; 
Hajdu et al. 2017a,b; Simonovits et al 2018, Grow et al. 2016, Kisfalusi et al. 2018, Kisfalusi et al. 
2019). 
 Students in Hungary attend untracked compulsory primary schools from 1st through 8th 
 
grade, corresponding to elementary and middle school in the United States. Students attend local 
schools. Therefore, the ethnic composition of the student body in each school reflects the ethnic 
composition of the local catchment area. Students form stable classrooms that receive 
instruction in all core (and most other) subjects together. Furthermore, most subjects are taught 
in the same room (except physical education, and, depending on facilities and grade level, art, 
music, and the sciences). Seating charts are set by teachers and fixed for all subjects within a 
given room. The core subjects in primary school are Hungarian grammar (writing), Hungarian 
literature (reading), and mathematics. Grades in these subjects determine the subsequent 
allocation of students to tracked secondary schools, starting in 9th grade. Instruction is lecture 
based, interspersed with group work between deskmates. 
Interethnic contact in schools occurs at multiple levels. Students have limited exposure 
to schoolmates across grades, with whom they only share recess. Students share more time with 
their classmates, with whom they share instruction in most subjects. Finally, students are most 
exposed to their deskmates, with whom they share the closest proximity throughout the school 
day and with whom they cooperate in group work.  
3.2. Scope conditions in context  
We test the causal effects of interethnic exposures between Roma and non-Roma Hungarians on 
interethnic friendship and discrimination against Roma at two different levels: first, at the desk 
level within classrooms; second across classrooms within schools.  
Ex-ante expectations about the fit between our setting and the scope conditions for 
contact and conflict theory determine theoretical predictions for the effects of these exposures.  
We argue that deskmate exposures to ethnic others, even more so than classmate exposures, 
 
best fit the scope conditions of contact theory, especially in the expansive interpretation of 
Pettigrew et al. (1998). Support for interethnic contact by an authority is self-evident: schools 
have assigned Roma and non-Roma students to the same classrooms, and teachers seat Roma 
and non-Roma students next to each other at the same desk. Equal status of students is given in 
the sense that Roma and non-Roma students share the same classroom as peers, have the same 
teacher, and are subject to the same curriculum and grading standards. Roma and non-Roma 
students collaborate and pursue common goals in group work. Exposure is long lasting, in that 
students typically stay with their classmates from 1st through 8th grade, and seating charts are set 
for a whole semester. Finally, classrooms are ripe with friendship potential, as we document 
below. We therefore expect that sitting next to, and sharing a classroom with, Roma students 
will increase interethnic friendships and decrease discrimination by non-Roma students, in line 
with contact theory.  
Like most natural settings, however, one can easily argue that our setting also strains 
against the scope conditions of contact theory. For example, the degree of actual collaboration 
between deskmates and classmates in pursuit of common goals may not be extensive, just like 
the degree of cooperation may not be extensive between college roommates. Similarly, equal 
status among students within the formal framework of Hungarian education does not prevent 
community prejudice from inflecting interactions among students or between students and 
teachers, much like randomly assigning college roommates does not prevent social hierarchies 
from entering dorms. One might therefore also legitimately expect that sitting next to, and 
sharing a classroom with, Roma students might worsen inter- and intra-ethnic relations, in line 
with conflict and constrict theory.  
 
Our pre-analysis plan registered positive expectations for the effects of interethnic 
exposure at the desk-level, because we judge the fit between our setting and the scope 
conditions of contact theory to be no worse than the fit in studies of college roommates, which 
form the backbone of field experimental support of contact theory. However, in order to honor 
the ambiguity of the scope conditions, we specifically pre-registered double-sided statistical tests 
at all levels of analysis, to enable testing the predictions not only of contact, but also of conflict 
and constrict theory.  
Our ability to test contact and conflict theory at once means that our study tests whether 
our novel setting meets the scope conditions of either theory. Hence, our study generates new 
insights not only into the scope conditions of either theory, but into the boundary conditions 
between theories.  
 
4. Study design  
Our study is distinguished by three main design elements. First, we create a randomized vignette 
experiment to measure interethnic discrimination of non-Roma students against Roma students. 
Second, we randomize the seating charts within classrooms to evaluate exposure to Roma vs 
non-Roma students at the desk level within classrooms. Third, we exploit quasi-random variation 
in the share of Roma students across classrooms within schools to evaluate the effect of 
classroom level exposures. 
 
4.1 Vignette experiment to measure discrimination 
In order to measure ethnic discrimination, we designed a two-question survey experiment that 
 
presented students with a scenario to lend money to their classmates during a hypothetical field 
trip to the zoo. The first question (Question 9a) was designed to introduce the scenario by 
eliciting students’ willingness to lend money to their deskmate. It reads (in translation):  
”Imagine that you are going to the zoo with some of your classmates. Your deskmate 
(whom you sat next to in Hungarian class in December) has forgotten to bring money for the 
entrance ticket. You have enough money for two entrance tickets. Would you lend your 
deskmate the money for the entrance ticket?”  
We note that this first question was designed merely to introduce the scenario; it was not 
designed to elicit information about effects of deskmates on ethnic discrimination. While we can 
use it to measure differences for people with different deskmates, we cannot use it to estimate 
the effect of exposure since e.g., students sitting next to a Roma student are not asked to make 
a decision about a non-Roma deskmate.3 In order to measure discrimination, and the effects of 
exposure to a Roma deskmate on discrimination, we therefore conducted a survey experiment 
that randomly assigned students to different ethnic prompts. Question 9b reads:  
”Now imagine that it is not your deskmate, but a different classmate who has forgotten to 
bring money with him/her. This classmate is a Roma/Gypsy. Would you lend this 
Roma/Gypsy classmate the money for the entrance ticket?”  
The bold text is only presented to a random half of the students.4 The answer categories were 
“Yes,” “No,” and “I do not know.”  
Vignette experiments are commonly used for eliciting attitudes that cannot be inferred 
from manifest behavior, or when researchers are worried about social desirability bias (Atzmüller 
and Steiner 2010; Hainmueller et al. 2015). Vignette experiments have previously been used to 
 
study discrimination (Finseraas et al. 2016; Jakobsson et al. 2016). Since the only difference for 
the respondents is whether or not they are told that the classmate is of Roma ethnicity, and since 
this difference is randomly assigned, the difference in response to this question measures 
discrimination.  The experiment also measures differences in in-group and out-group trust, which 
has previously been shown to be affected by close inter-group contact (Finseraas et al. 2019).  
 
4.2 Randomizing deskmates 
The field experiment manipulated interethnic contact between Roma and non-Roma students by 
randomizing the seating chart within 3rd through 8th grade classrooms of schools in rural 
Hungary. Students were randomly allocated to freestanding front-facing desks seating two students 
each based on class lists provided by the schools. The intervention commenced at the beginning of 
the 2017 fall semester, and we encouraged adherence to  the seat ing  chart  until the end of 
the semester in January 2018. Outcomes data were collected by the field team in the spring of 
2018, including the randomized survey-vignette experiment.5  
Based on a set of pre-registered inclusion criteria, our base sample consists of 3,184 Roma 
and non-Roma students across 186 classrooms of 39 schools. Excluding the Roma students, who 
serve as exposures but not as subjects in the analyses below, the final analysis sample includes 
2,395 non-Roma students in 175 classrooms and 39 schools. Ex-ante power calculations were 
based on a sample of at least 2000 non-Roma individuals; hence, our sample is sufficiently large 
to detect meaningful effects.  
4.3. Quasi-randomization of classmates  
We investigate the effect of grade or classroom-level exposure to Roma students using 
 
quasi-experimental strategies that exploit across-classroom (grade) variation in the share of 
Roma students. We assume that the variation in the share of Roma is essentially random in such 
regressions, an assumption that is more likely to hold when we add school fixed effects and when 
investigating across grade variation. The variation in this latter specification will be driven by 
cohort-by-cohort variation at the same school.   
5. Data and coding of main variables 
Here, we highlight the main features of our design and data collection. See Appendix B for details. A 
detailed pre-analysis plan was archived on March 22, 2018, before any endline data was received 
in June 2018. Any deviation from this plan is highlighted in the text. The data collection 
instruments and the pre-analysis plan [blinded for review] are reproduced in Appendix C. 
Replication data will be available online upon acceptance. We obtained consent from teachers and 
parents at multiple points. The study was approved by the IRB offices at [blinded for review]. 
We define three treatment variables; one for the deskmate intervention, one for the vignette 
experiment, and one for the cross-product of the two. The first treatment variable, Roma Deskmate, 
equals 1 if a student is randomized to sit next to a Roma deskmate at the beginning of the fall semester, 
and 0 otherwise. Students’ ethnicity was reported by classroom teachers at the beginning of the trial. 
By using assigned rather than actual deskmates we perform an intention to treat analysis that is 
not biased by the endogenous seating choices made by students and teachers after randomization. 
86 percent of students in the analysis sample were seated in compliance with assignment.6  
The second treatment variable is coded from the vignette experiment conducted at 
endline. The variable Roma Vignette equals 1 if the text of the vignette (Question 9b) asks 
students if they would lend money to a Roma classmate, and equals 0 if the text asks students to 
 
lend money to a classmate of unspecified ethnicity. The third treatment variable is the cross-
product between the first two, i.e. Roma Deskmate * Roma Vignette. This cross product equals 
1 if a student sitting next to a Roma deskmate is asked to lend money to a Roma classmate, and 
0 otherwise.  
Outcome variables were collected via a 45-minute two-part student survey at endline (see 
appendix). The first part of the survey (20 minutes) elicited ego-centric network data, contained 
the survey experiment,  and asked several other questions (which were pre-registered not to be 
analyzed in this paper).7 The two versions of the endline questionnaire containing the two versions of 
the survey vignette (Question 9b) were given to students in random order (using a random number 
generator).  
We pre-registered two main outcome variables: Lend to Classmate and Roma friend. The 
outcome variable Lend to Classmate is based on the survey vignette experiment (described above) 
and equals 1 if the respondent answers that they would, and 0 if they would not, lend money to 
the classmate. Roma friend captures whether an individual has a Roma friend among his or her 
best friends. Survey Question 5 generically prompts: ”Now in general think of your best friends, 
not just in the class but EVERYWHERE.” Question 5d subsequently prompts specifically: ”Among 
your best friends, how many are Roma (gypsy)?”. The outcome variable Roma Friend equals 1 if the 
individual has at least one Roma friend, and 0 otherwise.  
We also pre-registered several secondary outcome variables for exploratory analyses. In 
addition to investigating the probability of having a Roma friend, we also investigate effects on the 
Number of Roma friends, elicited in Question 5d. We also create the variables Deskmate among best 
friends (to see if deskmate relations in general are characterized by friendship potential) and Liked 
 
sitting next to deskmate. 
We collected baseline covariates from classroom-teacher reports, including students’ age (in 
0.1 years), gender, and spring-semester 2017 grades in five core subjects (Hungarian literature, 
Hungarian grammar, mathematics, diligence, and behavior, coded on a five-point integer scale where 
1 is worst and 5 is best). We filled in missing baseline grades from student self-reports at endline.8  
For remaining missing values, we coded the observation as zero and included dummy variables 
controlling for missing status in order to retain observations. 
Table 1  presents descriptive statistics for the sample of 2395 non-Roma ethnic Hungarian 
students,  separately by whether they were exposed to a Roma (treated) or non-Roma (control) 
deskmate. We see that 30 percent of non-Roma Hungarian students in the total sample have at 
least one Roma friend. This share naturally differs substantially across treated and control 
individuals because this descriptive comparison does not account for the substantial difference in the 
share of Roma students in the classroom (our subsequent analysis controls for pre-registered 
classroom fixed effects). We also see that 57 percent of students are willing to lend money to a 
classmate in the vignette experiment. The share that are willing to lend to a Roma classmate 
(Lend to Roma) is lower than the share willing to lend to an unspecified classmate (Lend to non-
Roma). For these variables there does not seem to be any difference between treated and control 
students. 
      (Table 1 here) 
Table 2, tests whether the randomization achieved covariate balance across treated and 
control individuals, after controlling for classroom fixed effects to account for experimental 
design. Columns 1-7 show the regression of treatment (having a Roma deskmate) on each of the 
 
baseline covariates and classroom fixed effects.  Column 8 include all baseline covariates 
simultaneously. Associations between the covariates and treatment would indicate a failure of 
randomization.  We see that there does not appear to be any differences across the treated and 
control groups. Following our pre-analysis plan, we also compute an F-test for whether the control 
variables jointly predict treatment status in a regression of treatment on all covariates. The p-value 
of the F-test is 0.25, indicating that the randomization was successful in achieving balance on 
observable factors. In column 9 we change the dependent variable to Roma vignette instead and 
we note that there is balance on baseline covariates also for this variable (the p-value of the F-
test is 0.83).  
We also note that among the 2395 individuals in our analytical sample, only 2102 and 
2124 answered the survey questions about lending and friendship respectively. Importantly, this 
attrition is unrelated to treatment status (the p-values are above 0.9 for Roma deskmate in 
regressions of attrition on Roma deskmate and class fixed effects).  
      (Table 2 here) 
6. Empirical strategy 
A large methodological literature in sociology, economics, and statistics documents the severe and 
often unexpected challenges of identifying peer effects when social ties are not randomly formed (e.g., 
Angrist 2014; Ogburn and VanderWeele 2014; Manski 1993). Our field experiment avoids these 
difficulties by randomizing deskmate relationships. In order to focus on the effect of exposure to a 
stigmatized minority group on the discrimination and friendship behaviors of the ethnic majority 
population, we exclude the Roma students themselves as subjects from the regressions. 
To analyze the effects of sitting next to a Roma deskmate and being prompted to lend money 
 
to a Roma classmate on the chance that a non-Roma student lends money to a classmate, we estimate 
the following regression: 
Lend to Classmateict2 = β Roma Deskmateict1 + θ Roma vignetteict2 + δ Roma 
Deskmatect1*Roma vignetteict2 + αClassct1 + γXict1 + ict2, 
where i indexes individuals, c indexes classrooms, and t is time (either baseline=1 or 
follow-up=2). Roma Deskmateict1 is a dummy equal to 1 if this person is assigned a Roma 
deskmate, Xict1 is a set of individual-level baseline covariates (described in section 4), and the 
error term, ict2. We add the variables Roma vignette, which equals 1 if the vignette prompts the 
student to lend money to a Roma classmate, and the interaction between Roma vignette and Roma 
Deskmate. A vector of classroom fixed effects, Classct1, is included as the randomization was 
conducted within classrooms. A positive and statistically significant estimate for the interaction 
term, 𝛿 > 0, would indicate support for the contact hypothesis that sitting next to a Roma 
deskmate diminishes discrimination toward Roma, whereas a statistically significant negative 
estimate, 𝛿 < 0, would indicate support for conflict hypothesis that sitting next to a Roma 
deskmate increases discrimination.  
The theories of inter-ethnic contact are thus tested by a difference in difference model. 
The estimate for 𝛿 gives the differential effect of inter-ethnic contact on lending money to a 
classmate when that classmate is identified as Roma.  We also interpret the coefficients for Roma 
Deskmate and for Roma vignette. In particular, we will divide the sample into classrooms that are 
majority Roma and classrooms that are majority non-Roma. In classes that are majority non-Roma, 
being prompted to lend to a classmate of unspecified ethnicity de facto prompts students to lend 
money to a non-Roma. Hence, the coefficient for Roma Deskmate in equation 2 tests whether 
 
having a Roma deskmate affects in- group trust. According to constrict theory, exposure to ethnic 
diversity should lead to lower trust towards the in-group. The coefficient for Roma vignette 
estimates the differential willingness to lend to a Roma classmate for individuals not exposed to a 
Roma deskmate. Since both deskmates and the vignette are randomized, all three coefficients 
can be given causal interpretations.  
We estimate the following regression to identify the effect of being randomly assigned to 
sitting next to a Roma deskmate on the probability of having a Roma friend: 
 RomaF riendict2 = β Roma Deskmateict1 + αClassct1 + γXict1 + ict2, 
A positive and statistically significant estimate 𝛽 > 0 would support the contact 
hypothesis that sitting next to a Roma student increases the chance of naming a Roma among a 
student’s best friends, and 𝛽 < 0 would lend support to conflict theory.   
We present all results with and without the baseline controls; our primary specification 
is without controls. Control variables are included as they may increase power, although they are 
not necessary for identification. To avoid distortions form functional form restrictions, we add all 
control variables as series of indicator variables (Athey and Imbens, 2017).  We report 
heteroscedasticity-robust Huber-White standard errors for all models. Standard errors do not need 
to be clustered at any level, as randomization occurred the individual level (Abadie et al., 2017).  
In the quasi-experimental analysis of classroom level exposure we conduct several 
analyses. First, we regress lending on the share of Roma in the class and the interactions without 
any controls. Second, we include school-level fixed effects to defend against the possibility that 
non-Roma families in high-Roma schools (and hence high-Roma classrooms) are positively 
selected for interethnic trust (perhaps because non-Roma families who most object to 
 
interethnic exposure leave the school district) or negatively selected (for instance due to housing 
prices in such areas attract people that may have other social issues and therefore less trust).9 
Third, we control for classroom-average GPA to defend against the possibility that ability sorting 
across classrooms within grades influences the share of Roma in the classroom.  This final analysis 
is hence expected mostly to exploit variation in the share of Roma students across grades within 
school. We expect this cross-cohort variation to be largely random (Hoxby 2000; Gould, Levy, 
Passerman 2009).10 
6 Results 
6.1 Discrimination and Field experimental results 
Table 3 presents our primary results. We start by showing the effects of having a Roma deskmate on 
lending to a classmate using our vignette experiment. Our hypothesis was that being assigned to a 
Roma deskmate would increase the relative probability of willingness to lend to a Roma classmate. 
Column 1 shows our main pre-specified regression, with classroom fixed effects but without other 
covariates. We see that the coefficient for Roma vignette is negative and statistically significant, 
implying that non-exposed students are considerably less willing to lend to a Roma classmate than 
to a classmate of unspecified ethnicity. Being randomly prompted to lend to a Roma classmate lowers 
the probability that a non-Roma student is willing to lend by 18 percentage points. The mean in the 
control group (non-Roma vignette and non-Roma deskmate) is 67 percent, so the effect corresponds 
to a  27 percent lower likelihood of lending money to a Roma classmate. We conclude that non-
Roma students strongly discriminate against Roma students. 
      (Table 3 here) 
Our main interest lies, however, in whether sitting next to a Roma student affects 
 
students’ differential willingness to lend to a Roma student, as captured by the coefficient on the 
Roma deskmate*Roma vignette. We see that that there is no statistically significant effect, and the 
coefficient (-0.03, p=0.61) is small and even negative, suggesting that treatment did not change 
the differential between lending to a Roma classmate or a random classmate.  
The coefficient on Roma deskmate estimates the effect of being assigned to a Roma deskmate 
on wanting to lend money to a random (not-specifically Roma) classmate. We see that this effect is 
close to zero and not statistically significant (-0.03, p=0.57). If there were no majority Roma 
classrooms, this effect would be a test of the constrict hypothesis. In the majority Roma 
classrooms, not specifying the ethnicity of the classmate would most likely be interpreted as a 
prompt to lend to a Roma classmate. In appendix Table A.11 we show that the coefficient is also 
small and not statistically significant in non-Roma majority classrooms and we can thereby reject 
the constrict hypothesis that exposure to the ethnic outgroup reduces trust in the in-group. 
Column 3 of Table 3 presents our pre-specified estimates for the effect of having a Roma 
deskmate on counting at least one Roma friend among one’s best friends. The estimate is very close 
to zero and has a small standard error (-0.03, p=0.34). Hence, we find no support for the notion 
that sitting next to a Roma affects inter-ethnic friendships for non-Roma Hungarian students. Adding 
baseline covariates in column 4 does not appreciably change the results.  
Table 4  presents estimates for the effects of having a Roma deskmate on our pre-specified 
secondary outcomes. We find no effect of having a Roma deskmate on the students’ number of 
Roma friends (column 1). Columns 2-4 show results intended to capture antipathy and distrust 
towards Roma deskmates. If the deskmate was Roma, non-Roma students were less likely to 
espouse a willingness to lend to their deskmate, were less likely to like sitting next to their deskmate, 
 
and were less likely to nominate their deskmate as one of the 5 closest friends. Note that the 
results in columns 2-4 are not suited to detect any effects of exposure to a Roma deskmate on 
students’ attitudes toward Roma individuals in general, as all treated individuals have a Roma 
deskmate and all non-treated individuals have a non-Roma deskmate. The results in columns 2-
4 show, however, that there is substantial antipathy and distrust towards Roma students, even 
among those exposed to Roma deskmates.11 The table also shows that deskmates usually like 
each other and that deskmates are likely to become friends in general.12  
      (Table 4 here) 
6.2 Quasi-experimental results 
We move on to test whether classroom level exposure affects inter-ethnic discrimination and 
friendship formation. We explored several specifications and we present the results in Table 5. 
We create a standardized variable (with mean zero and a standard deviation of 1) of the share of 
Roma students in the classroom and interact this variable with our main treatment variables.13 The 
standard errors in these regressions are clustered at the classroom level. 
In column 1 we regress lending on the share of Roma in the class and the interactions 
without any controls. We see that there is no statistically significant relationship between the 
share of Roma in the class interacted with getting the Roma vignette. That is, there is no 
difference in reported lending for individuals having relatively more or fewer Roma students in 
the class. Neither is there any interaction between having a Roma deskmate and having many 
Roma in your class. In columns 2 and 3 we see that the results are similar if we add school fixed 
effects and classroom-average GPA. The results of these exploratory models consistently fail to 
support that greater classroom level exposure to Roma students reduces discrimination among 
 
non-Roma students. 
      (Table 5 here) 
We also analyze the effect of having more Roma students in the class on the probability 
of having a Roma as one of the best friends in the same fashion. We see in column 4 that the 
share of Roma in the class is itself highly correlated with the probability of having a Roma friend. 
We also note that that there is no statistically significant effect of being assigned a Roma deskmate in 
classrooms with an average share of Roma on nominating a Roma student as a best friend, but 
the interaction term is statistically significant in column 4, showing that the effect of having a 
Roma deskmate is more negative in classrooms with a greater share of Roma students. To alleviate 
some of the endogeneity concerns we include school fixed effects and compare classrooms within 
the same schools. In column 5 (which includes school fixed effects) we see that the share of Roma 
in the class is highly predictive of nominating a Roma student as a best friend. Having a one-standard 
deviation greater share of Roma students in the class (about 17 percent) is correlated with a 16 
percentage points higher probability of having a Roma friend as compared to having an average share 
of Roma classmates (12 percent). The results point to the classroom as an important arena for 
exposure to enhance cross-ethnic friendships and the results are robust to controlling for average 
class GPA (column 6). There is no sign of a differential treatment effect by Roma deskmates having 
different effects in classes with few and many Roma once school fixed effects are controlled for.   
In total, while the share of Roma at the classroom level may be important for friendship 
formation it does not seem to be sufficient to affect the degree of discrimination against Roma 
students. Therefore, neither deskmate- nor classroom-level exposure to ethnic others appear to 
suffice to eliminate, or even diminish, discrimination. 
 
7 Conclusion 
Contact theory posits that close, collaborative contact under conditions of institutionally 
supported equal status will reduce prejudice and discrimination against ethnic others. By 
contrast, conflict theory suggests that shallow or competitive exposure may increase antipathy 
and discrimination. Little is known about where the lines between close versus shallow and 
collaborative versus competitive exposure are drawn, so it is unclear in what situations exposure 
produces beneficial outcomes.  
Previous evidence on whether exposure reduces prejudice is mixed. Shallow exposure is 
generally correlated with more prejudice and less trust (e.g., Delhey and Newton, 2005; Dinesen 
and Sønderskov, 2015) and has been found to causally increase prejudice (e.g., Enos, 2014;2016, 
Hangartner et al. 2019). On the other hand, a number of well identified studies using random 
assignment of peers have found positive effects of close personal contact (e.g., Boisjoly et al., 
2006; Carrell et al., 2019; Dahl et al. 2018; Finseraas and Kotsadam, 2017; Finseraas et al., 2016, 
Finseraas et al. 2019).  In a recent meta-analysis, Paluck et al. (2019) can only identify three 
studies that meet what they label “the very highest standards of experimental quality and 
research transparency” (p. 150), in particular having pre-specified analysis plans, and they argue 
that we need more high quality studies to learn more about whether and when contact theory 
operates.  
In a well-powered, pre-registered, randomized field experiment, we test whether 
deskmate exposure to Roma students in Hungarian schools affects discrimination. Using a 
vignette experiment, we show that non-Roma students discriminate and trust Roma students 
less. We further show that being randomly assigned a Roma deskmate does not affect non-Roma 
students’ discrimination nor the probability of having a Roma best friend. This is quite stark as 
 
students are sitting next to their deskmates for around 20 hours each week. In addition we show 
that the students exposed to Roma deskmates show substantial antipathy towards them, as they 
are less likely to like sitting next to their deskmate and less likely to have their deskmate as one 
of the 5 closest friends as compared to students with non-Roma deskmates.  
We further investigated whether there are effects of inter-ethnic contact at the classroom 
level. Leveraging a quasi-experimental approach with school fixed effects, we find no support 
for this. In this setup we do find, however, that the share of Roma at the classroom level seems 
to be important for friendship formation. Nonetheless, even when cross-ethnic friendship levels 
are higher, it does not seem to be sufficient to affect the degree of discrimination against Roma 
students.  
Our findings disappoint the hope that an easy intervention of increasing spatial proximity 
through deskmate assignments could ameliorate ethnic discrimination. While prior research has 
found that enforced ethnic intermingling in college dorm rooms or military boot camp squadrons 
does increase inter-ethnic trust, the intensity of such contact may be hard to replicate in more 
everyday settings (Paluck and Green 2009). Our results suggest that in order for close contact to 
reduce discrimination, it must be more intense (e.g. by sharing living quarters in college) and/or 
more collaborative (e.g. by sustained teamwork in military boot camp) than sharing a desk with 
another student. Or perhaps the contact must take place in a setting where participants enjoy 
more equal status than do Roma and non-Roma children in Hungarian schools, that is, perhaps 
the positive effects of interethnic contact presuppose relatively low levels of existing ethnic 
inequalities. The equal status condition may be hampered for several reasons. The school setting 
need not be one where status differences are minimal or the parents and the teachers may be 
 
biased so that there is no enforcement of equal status. Prejudice against the Roma is widespread 
and severe in Hungary. For instance, Hajdu, et al., (2017b) report that 40 percent of Hungarians 
think Roma customers should be banned from bars and where 60 percent agree with the 
statement that the inclination for criminality is “in the blood” of the Roma. In such a context it is 
likely that adults, such as parents and teachers, are not enforcing equal status.  
If the conditions for contact theory really need to be as stark as sharing rooms or in 
settings with equal status in the wider community there is little hope for large-scale social change 
by exposure. This raises the spectre that many well intentioned contact interventions in settings 
of ethnic inequality amount to cosmetics, like rearranging the desk chairs on a ship whose 
destination is otherwise determined. 
While deskmate exposure does not lead to less ethnic discrimination among Hungarian 
school children, it is important to note that it does not lead to more discrimination either. As 
such, our paper shows that the setting is not one where the scope conditions of conflict theory 
applies. Neither do we find any evidence that exposure to a Roma deskmate affects trust within 
the majority group, thereby we also reject the constrict hypothesis in this setting. Future work 
should continue to evaluate the scope conditions of contact theory. If they do, we further urge 
them to pre-register the experiments so that we can start to build a truly credible research base 
on these issues, which are likely to be ever more contentious in the future due to our societies 
becoming more and more diverse.  
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Hajdu, Tamas, Gabor Kertesi, and Gabor Kézdi, “Health Differences at  Birth  between Roma and 
Non-Roma Children in Hungary-Long-Run Trends and Decompositions,” Technical Report, Institute of 
 
Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 2017. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 Gerber and Malhotra (2008) document that the leading sociology journals prioritize the publication of statistically 
significant findings in general. 
2 While pre-registration does not by itself guarantee high methodological standards, it at least guards against the 
problem of “p-hacking” (respecifying models until results meet desired levels of statistical significance, despite the 
                                                          
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
fact that respecification can invalidate p-values (Head et al. 2015) and  “HARKing” (“hypothesizing after the results 
are known,” which also invalidates p-values (Christensen et al. 2019). 
3 Imagine that we would find that those sitting next to a Roma deskmate are less likely to lend out money to their 
deskmates. This tells us nothing about the effect of exposure as we do not know the counterfactual lending of this 
person to a Roma deskmate had they not had a Roma deskmate. 
4 Although the Hungarian term for “gypsy”, similar to the English term, carries derogatory connotations, it is a 
commonly used term in Hungary, and it is the only descriptor of this minority known to many school children.  By 
contrast, the term “Roma” is not universally known to non-Roma school children. Hence, we prompt for both 
“Roma” and “Gypsy.” We did not specify the ethnicity of the hypothetical classmate when not prompting for a 
Roma classmate, because we did not want to make ethnicity salient for the control group.   
5 We pre-tested the survey instrument in one out-of-sample school in the same geographic area in the Fall of 2017. 
6 Compliance is not correlated with treatment status and the conclusions remain the same if we restrict the 
sample to classrooms with at least 90 percent compliance (see Appendix Table A.1).  
7 The second part of the endline survey consisted of a reading comprehension test that is not part of this project. 
8 We did not pre-register that we would fill in missing baseline grades from student self-reports, but the procedure 
does not affect conclusions. 
9 The use of school fixed effects was not pre-registered but we chose to report these results because they add to our 
understanding of the mechanisms at play. 
10 In Appendix Table A.12 we present results with grade level variation rather than class, and the results are very 
similar. 
11 The finding that non-Roma students are less likely to befriend their deskmate when they are assigned a Roma 
rather than a non-Roma deskmate reveals ethnic antipathy on the part of the non-Roma students. This finding 
does not, however, mean that being seated next to a Roma deskmate has caused this ethnic antipathy in the first 
place.  Hence, it does not imply that seating non-Roma students next to Roma students makes non-Roma students 
less favorably inclined to Roma students in general, or even toward the particular Roma student who is their 
deskmate. This reading is consistent with the results of Table 3, columns 3 and 4, which does test whether sitting 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
next to a Roma student increases (or decreases) discrimination, and finds no evidence that it does. 
12 We extensively explored the possibility of heterogeneous treatment effects but found little indication of effects 
for any specific group of students.  Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4 show that there is no indication of heterogenous 
treatment effects based on ego characteristics and Tables A.5 and A.6 show the same for deskmate characteristics 
(age, gender, baseline grades). All continuous variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of 1 to facilitate interpretation in the heterogeneity analyses. Appendix Table A.7 shows that there are 
no statistically significant treatment effects for neither same sex deskmates or sex discordant deskmates. We 
further specified that we would investigate whether it makes a difference whether or not the person lent to his or 
her deskmate in an analysis of lending to Roma. In Appendix Table A.10 we show that people that are willing to 
lend to their deskmate are more willing to also lend to a Roma classmate but the treatment effect of exposure to 
Roma deskmate is not statistically significantly different between those willing to lend to their deskmates and not. 
As there is no heterogeneity we do not proceed with using machine learning techniques to validate the search for 
heterogenous treatment effects (as pre-specified). 
13 Using the share instead of a majority indicator has several advantages. In particular, we only have 133 non-Roma 
students in majority Roma classrooms, and the share of Roma students is a likely confounder for treatment even 
within the groups of majority and minority Roma classrooms. We show the corresponding results with majority status 
of the classrooms in Appendix Table A.9. 
Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Total Treated Control
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Main dependent variables
Roma friend 0.30 (0.46) 0.52 (0.50) 0.27 (0.44)
Lend to Classmate 0.57 (0.49) 0.57 (0.50) 0.57 (0.49)
Other outcome variables
Number of Roma friends 0.84 (2.60) 1.89 (3.86) 0.71 (2.36)
Lend to Roma 0.48 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50)
Lend to non-Roma 0.67 (0.47) 0.66 (0.48) 0.67 (0.47)
Lend to Deskmate 0.83 (0.38) 0.76 (0.43) 0.84 (0.37)
Liked sitting next to Deskmate 0.58 (0.49) 0.49 (0.50) 0.59 (0.49)
Deskmate among best friends 0.29 (0.46) 0.20 (0.40) 0.31 (0.46)
Main exposure variable
Roma Deskmate 0.12 (0.33) 1.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Control variables
Age (in years) 11.83 (1.82) 11.97 (1.81) 11.81 (1.82)
Mathematics 3.83 (1.01) 3.68 (1.00) 3.85 (1.01)
Grammar 3.96 (1.00) 3.79 (1.11) 3.98 (0.98)
Literature 3.83 (1.08) 3.67 (1.13) 3.85 (1.07)
Diligence 4.15 (0.88) 4.03 (0.92) 4.17 (0.88)
Behavior 4.41 (0.76) 4.34 (0.82) 4.42 (0.75)
Variables for heterogeneity analysis
GPA 3.87 (0.94) 3.71 (0.99) 3.89 (0.93)
Deskmate of same sex 0.50 (0.50) 0.46 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50)
Share of Roma in class 0.12 (0.17) 0.38 (0.24) 0.08 (0.13)
N 2395 291 2104
Notes: All samples consist of non-Roma students that have a non-missing value on Roma desk-
mate. In column 2 we restrict the sample to students that have a Roma deskmate and in column
3 to students that do not have a Roma deskmate.
Table 2: Balance test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Roma Deskmate (RD) RD RD RD RD RD RD RD Roma vignette
Age (in 0.1 years) 0.0012 0.00029 -0.00057
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0024)
Girl -0.0012 -0.00054 -0.012
(0.012) (0.013) (0.025)
Mathematics -0.0071 -0.00056 0.0070
(0.0065) (0.011) (0.021)
Grammar -0.0082 -0.0052 0.0019
(0.0066) (0.012) (0.022)
Literature -0.0041 0.0066 -0.023
(0.0063) (0.010) (0.020)
Diligence -0.010 -0.019 -0.018
(0.0075) (0.014) (0.028)
Behavior -0.00051 0.0093 0.036*
(0.0084) (0.011) (0.022)
Mean dep. var in C group 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.50
No. of observations 2360 2395 2274 2274 2277 2279 2279 2238 2101
R-squared 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.08
Class F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All regressions control for class fixed effects. Conducting an F-test of whether the control variables jointly predict treatment
status we get an F-value of 1.09 with an associated p-value of 0.2459. In the test we include all the controls as indicator variables
and control for class fixed effects. In column 9 the dependent variable to Roma vignette and the F-value of predicting this variable
is 0.87 with a p-value of 0.8257. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 3: Effects of Roma deskmate on having a Roma friend among
the best friends and on lending to a classmate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lend to Classmate Lend to Classmate Roma friend Roma friend
Roma Deskmate -0.030 -0.027 -0.034 -0.036
(0.053) (0.056) (0.036) (0.037)
Roma vignette -0.18*** -0.17***
(0.023) (0.023)
Roma Deskmate*Roma vignette -0.034 -0.052
(0.067) (0.070)
Mean dep. var in C group 0.67 0.67 0.27 0.27
No. of observations 2102 2102 2124 2124
R-squared 0.22 0.26 0.34 0.38
Class F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: All regressions control for class fixed effects. The baseline controls in columns 2 and
4 are indicator variables for gender, age in 0.1 year brackets, baseline grades in mathematics,
grammar, literature, diligence, and behavior (all with one dummy for each level of the grade,
which range from 1-5 and a dummy for not being graded). Robust standard errors are presented
in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 4: Effects of Roma deskmate on other outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Roma friends Lend to deskmate Liked sitting next to deskmate Deskmate among best friends
Roma Deskmate -0.042 -0.073** -0.085** -0.13***
(0.19) (0.034) (0.041) (0.036)
Mean dep. var in C group 0.71 0.84 0.59 0.31
No. of observations 2124 1989 2028 2170
R-squared 0.37 0.13 0.16 0.14
Class F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All regressions control for class fixed effects. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 5: Effects of Roma deskmate in different classrooms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lend Lend Lend Friend Friend Friend
Roma Deskmate (RD) 0.019 0.0014 -0.00038 0.0014 -0.035 -0.043
(0.070) (0.069) (0.068) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Share Roma in class 0.0091 0.044 0.031 0.22*** 0.16*** 0.14***
(0.027) (0.039) (0.035) (0.017) (0.033) (0.030)
Roma Deskmate*share Roma -0.026 0.0048 0.016 -0.068** -0.017 -0.0062
(0.044) (0.042) (0.041) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Roma vignette (RV) -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.18***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Roma Deskmate*Roma vignette -0.15 -0.13 -0.14
(0.096) (0.091) (0.090)
RV*Share Roma 0.026 0.023 0.024
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
RD*RV*Share Roma 0.090 0.055 0.050
(0.056) (0.053) (0.052)
Average class GPA -0.12*** -0.18***
(0.043) (0.030)
Mean dep. var in C group 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27
No. of observations 2102 2102 2102 2124 2124 2124
R-squared 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.21 0.23
School F.E. No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Average class GPA No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the class level are presented in parentheses. *,
**, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
APPENDIX: FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
A Regression results tables discussed in the text
Table A.1: Effects of Roma deskmate when
restricting the sample to classrooms with over
90 percent compliance.
(1) (2)
Roma friend Lend to Classmate




Roma Deskmate*Roma vignette -0.0034
(0.088)
Mean dep. var in C group 0.23 0.66
No. of observations 1120 1117
R-squared 0.33 0.22
Class F.E. Yes Yes
Sample
Notes: All regressions control for class fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** de-
note significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table A.2: Effects of Roma deskmate in regres-
sions with controls without including indicator
variables for missing values
(1) (2)
Roma friend Lend to Classmate




Roma Deskmate*Roma vignette -0.043
(0.071)
Mean dep. var in C group 0.26 0.67
No. of observations 2047 2021
R-squared 0.38 0.26
Class F.E. Yes Yes
Baseline Controls No Yes
Baseline*Treatment No No
Notes: All regressions control for class fixed effects. The base-
line controls are indicator variables for gender, age in 0.1 year
brackets, baseline grades in mathematics, grammar, literature,
diligence, and behavior (all with one dummy for each level of
the grade, which range from 1-5 and a dummy for not being
graded). We do not include missing values as indicator vari-
ables in these regressions. *, **, *** denote significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table A.3: Heterogeneous effects of Roma deskmates on Roma friend based on ego
baseline characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Friend Friend Friend Friend Friend Friend Friend Friend
Roma Deskmate (RD) -0.035 -0.031 -0.024 -0.027 -0.021 -0.016 -0.014 -0.025

































Mean dep. var in C group 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
No. of observations 2124 2124 2046 2047 2048 2049 2049 2048
R-squared 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
Class F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All regressions control for class fixed effects. All continuous variables are standardized to have mean zero
and standard deviation 1 for ease of interpretation. Girl is kept as a dummy variable. Robust standard errors are
presented in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table A.4: Heterogeneous effects of Roma deskmates on Lend to classmate based
on ego baseline characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lend Lend Lend Lend Lend Lend Lend Lend
Roma Deskmate (RD) -0.027 0.027 -0.032 -0.031 -0.030 -0.029 -0.031 -0.029

















Roma vignette (RV) -0.18*** -0.20*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18***
(0.023) (0.031) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Roma Deskmate*Roma vignette -0.032 -0.071 -0.027 -0.026 -0.024 -0.017 -0.013 -0.027

















































Mean dep. var in C group 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
No. of observations 2102 2102 2020 2022 2024 2025 2025 2024
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
Class F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All regressions control for class fixed effects. All continuous variables are standardized to have mean zero
and standard deviation 1 for ease of interpretation. Girl is kept as a dummy variable. Robust standard errors are
presented in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table A.5: Heterogeneous effects of Roma deskmates on Roma friend based
on deskmate baseline characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Friend Friend Friend Friend Friend Friend Friend Friend
Roma Deskmate (RD) -0.035 -0.043 -0.028 -0.052 -0.014 0.00062 -0.014 -0.030

































Mean dep. var in C group 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
No. of observations 2124 2124 2015 2015 2019 2020 2020 2020
R-squared 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
Class F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All regressions control for class fixed effects. All continuous variables are standardized to have
mean zero and standard deviation 1 for ease of interpretation. Girl is kept as a dummy variable. Ro-
bust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% level, respectively.
Table A.6: Heterogeneous effects of Roma deskmates on Lend to classmate based
on deskmate baseline characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lend Lend Lend Lend Lend Lend Lend Lend
Roma Deskmate (RD) -0.027 -0.099 0.0065 -0.015 0.016 0.0096 -0.0082 0.016

















Roma vignette (RV) -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18***
(0.023) (0.031) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Roma Deskmate*Roma vignette -0.032 -0.011 0.029 0.051 0.016 0.035 -0.0056 0.041

















































Mean dep. var in C group 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
No. of observations 2102 2102 1990 1990 1994 1996 1996 1995
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
Class F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All regressions control for class fixed effects. All continuous variables are standardized to have mean zero
and standard deviation 1 for ease of interpretation. Girl is kept as a dummy variable. Robust standard errors
are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table A.7: Effects of Roma deskmate depending on sex concordance of
deskmate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Roma friend Roma friend Lend to Classmate Lend to Classmate
Roma Deskmate -0.043 -0.063 -0.24*** 0.100
(0.068) (0.049) (0.087) (0.076)
Roma vignette -0.19*** -0.19***
(0.033) (0.034)
Roma Deskmate*Roma vignette 0.14 -0.18*
(0.11) (0.094)
Mean dep. var in C group 0.27 0.26 0.68 0.66
No. of observations 1056 1068 1045 1057
R-squared 0.40 0.40 0.30 0.28
Class F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deskmate sex Same sex Different sex Same sex Different sex
Notes: All regressions control for class fixed effects. Robust standard errors are presented in
parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table A.8: Effects of Roma deskmate in majority Roma and non Roma class-
rooms.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Roma friend Roma friend Lend to Classmate Lend to Classmate
Roma Deskmate -0.093 -0.028 0.036 -0.00079
(0.11) (0.039) (0.15) (0.057)
Roma vignette 0.091 -0.18***
(0.15) (0.023)
Roma Deskmate*Roma vignette -0.030 -0.11
(0.21) (0.074)
Mean dep. var in C group 0.86 0.25 0.55 0.67
No. of observations 103 2021 113 1989
R-squared 0.39 0.29 0.44 0.21
Class F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Majority Roma Majority non-Roma Majority Roma Majority non-Roma
Notes: All regressions control for class fixed effects. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table A.9: Effects of Roma deskmate in majority
Roma and non Roma classrooms.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lend Lend Friend Friend
Roma Deskmate (RD) 0.018 0.019 0.17*** 0.027
(0.058) (0.057) (0.047) (0.046)
Roma vignette (RV) -0.19*** -0.19***
(0.027) (0.026)
Roma Deskmate*Roma vignette -0.089 -0.094
(0.084) (0.082)
Majority Roma class -0.12 -0.13 0.60*** 0.22***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.053) (0.078)
Roma Deskmate*Majority Roma 0.037 0.12 -0.23*** -0.058
(0.16) (0.15) (0.083) (0.086)
RV*Majority Roma 0.20 0.17
(0.13) (0.12)
RD*RV*Majority Roma 0.18 0.11
(0.21) (0.20)
Mean dep. var in C group 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27
No. of observations 2102 2102 2124 2124
R-squared 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.19
School F.E. No Yes No Yes
Average class GPA No No No No
Notes: All regressions control for class fixed effects. Robust standard
errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table A.10: Effects of Roma desk-
mate on lending to Roma interacted





Lend to Deskmate 0.31***
(0.045)
Roma Deskmate*Lend to Deskmate 0.087
(0.096)
Mean dep. var in C group 0.48
No. of observations 978
R-squared 0.33
Class F.E. Yes
Notes: All regressions control for class fixed ef-
fects. Robust standard errors are presented in
parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table A.11: Testing the con-
strict hypothesis: Effects of Roma
deskmate on lending to a non-






Mean dep. var in C group 0.67




Notes: All regressions control for class fixed
effects. Robust standard errors are pre-
sented in parentheses. *, **, *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
Table A.12: Effects of Roma deskmate in different grades
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lend Lend Lend Friend Friend Friend
Roma Deskmate (RD) 0.024 0.0096 0.0058 0.027 -0.0044 -0.012
(0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045)
Share Roma in grade 0.014 0.061 0.046 0.21*** 0.14*** 0.12***
(0.025) (0.040) (0.035) (0.019) (0.037) (0.033)
Roma Deskmate*share Roma -0.037 -0.0050 0.0078 -0.070** -0.026 -0.014
(0.043) (0.042) (0.041) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Roma vignette (RV) -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.18***
(0.025) (0.023) (0.024)
Roma Deskmate*Roma vignette -0.14 -0.13 -0.14
(0.096) (0.090) (0.090)
RV*Share Roma 0.022 0.019 0.022
(0.028) (0.026) (0.026)
RD*RV*Share Roma 0.094* 0.058 0.051
(0.054) (0.052) (0.051)
Average grade GPA -0.12*** -0.18***
(0.044) (0.031)
Mean dep. var in C group 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27
No. of observations 2102 2102 2102 2124 2124 2124
R-squared 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.22
School F.E. No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Average grade GPA No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the grade level are presented in parentheses.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
B Details about the data collection
We recruited schools from 7 contiguous counties of central Hungary (excluding the capital
city Budapest). In the spring of 2017, we contacted all primary schools in these counties
via the heads of the local school districts to elicit information about room layouts and
seating practices. By the end of the summer vacation, we had obtained initial participation
agreements with 55 schools in which most 3rd-8th grade classrooms were anticipated to meet
a set of inclusion criteria. These criteria were: 1) Principals and teachers would implement
our randomized seating chart in three subjects: Hungarian literature, Hungarian grammar,
and mathematics. 2) All students in a classroom would receive instruction in these subjects
together (e.g., no ability grouping). 3) Classroom layout would comprise free-standing desks
that seat two students. In these classrooms, the students were expected to sit next to their
deskmates for around 20 hours each week.
The intervention assigned students to free-standing two-person desks via unconstrained ran-
dom partitioning within each classroom. We based the randomization on the class rosters
from the preceeding spring semester. Shortly before the start of the fall semester, we submit-
ted the randomized seating charts to teachers for implementation. Teachers were instructed
to use the charts for the duration of the fall semester, until January 2018. To account for
changes to class rosters during the summer via exits and entries, we instructed teachers to
fill seats vacated by exiting students with entering students from left to right, front to back,
in alphabetic order of entering students’ surnames. Since, (i) in expectation, students enter
and exit classrooms for the same reason (repeating grades and residential moves); and (ii)
student surnames are reasonably orthogonal to student grades, this replacement rule pre-
serves randomization. We permitted teachers to reseat students where necessary, but we
asked teachers to preserve the desk-mate composition by moving both deskmates of a desk
together whenever possible. We measured compliance through teacher reports of the actual
seating chart for September 15, 2017. The field team again recorded the actual seating chart
during school visits between October and December 2017 and verified classroom layouts
through classroom photographs.
Schools and classrooms that did not meet our pre-registered inclusion criteria were dropped
from the study. We excluded 133 entire classrooms for the following reasons: Withdrawal
from the study (25); Less than 10 students at baseline (8); split (e.g. ability-grouped)
classrooms (10); desk layouts other than free-standing two-person desks (30); Unreliable
baseline reporting (7); Failure to implement the seating chart (40); Failure to report student
ethnicity (13). We also pre-registered to exclude students who were randomly assigned to
sit alone at a desk at baseline or who had missing outcomes.
C  Anonymized Pre-Analysis plan and Survey 
1 Introduction
The Roma is one of the largest and poorest ethnic minority groups in Europe. In Hungary,
the Roma population is estimated to constitute around 6 percent of the total population
and 10 to 12 percent of the young adolescent population (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2011b). The
Roma lag behind the general population in terms of health (Hajdu, Kertesi, and Kezdi,
2017a), education (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2011b), and employment (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2011a)
and prejuice against the Roma is widespread (Hajdu, Kertesi, and Kezdi, 2017b). Using
a large scale field experiment where we randomly assign desk mates in Hungarian schools
we investigate whether close personal contact to Roma increases inter-ethnic friendship and
trust.
Whether exposure reduces prejudice is an important question and previous evidence is
mixed. Several empirical studies find patterns that shallow exposure is correlated with
more prejudice and less trust (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Delhey and Newton, 2005;
Dinesen and Sønderskov, 2015; Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston, 2008). Putnam, (2007) has
even proposed a constrict theory, arguing that ethnic diversity may not only lead to less
trust between the majority and minority groups, it may also undermine trust within the
majority group. A major limitation of these studies is the inability to control for selection
issues and reverse causality (Baldassarri and Abascal, 2017). There are studies of close
personal contact arguing that contact under some conditions reduce prejudice and increases
trust (Allport, 1954) and well identified studies using random assignment of peers have found
such effects (Boisjoly et al., 2006; Burns, Corno, and La Ferrara, 2016; Carrell, Hoekstra,
and West, 2015; Finseraas and Kotsadam, 2017a; Finseraas et al., 2016). Kende, Tropp, and
Lantos, (2017) randomly assign 61 non-Roma Hungarians to face-to-face interaction with a
Roma person and found reduced prejudice for those exposed. The key condition for exposure
to reduce prejudice has been argued to be friendship potential (Laurence, 2009; Pettigrew,
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1998; Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston, 2008).
Similar people are more likely to form social ties (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook,
2001). This phenomenon, often described as social homophily, is consistent with a general
preference for similarity and has been documented within several fields of science (Byrne,
1961, 1971). The tendency of lower probability of friendships across ethnic groups, inbreeding
homophily, has been widely documented (see e.g. Jackson, (2014) and McPherson, Smith-
Lovin, and Cook, (2001), also in Hungary with respect to Roma (Hajdu, Kertesi, and Kezdi,
2017b).
Homophily generally comes in two distinct forms that are hard to disentangle: Choice
homophily and induced homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). The former
arises as a function of individual preferences for similarity while the latter is purely a function
of the opportunities people have to come into contact with each other. Exposure leads to
greater opportunities for choice homophily but the degree to which exposure is causing
friendship is uncertain. In previous studies it seems as if the level of analysis of the exposure
is crucial and neighborhoods do not seem to be close enough, and may even lead to increased
animosity, dorm rooms and army teams teems seem to be close and repetitive enough. It is
an open question whether classrooms and desk mates fall in the positive contact realm or
the negative conflict realm.
2 The field experiment and sample
We execute a large-scale randomized field experiment in 182 classrooms of 38 Hungarian
primary schools (after exclusions) containing 3539 students. The intervention consists of
randomizing the seating chart within each classroom at the beginning of the fall semester,
2017, and encouraging adherence until the end of the semester in January 2018. Endline
outcomes data are collected and will become available to the research team in May 2018.
In the spring of 2017, we contacted all primary schools in 7 contiguous counties of central
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Hungary via the heads of the local school districts to elicit information about room layouts
and seating practices. By the end of the summer vacation, we obtained initial participation
agreements with 55 schools in which most 3rd-8th grade classrooms were anticipated to meet
a set of inclusion criteria. These criteria were: 1) Principals and teachers would implement
our randomized seating chart in three subjects: Hungarian literature, Hungarian grammar,
and mathematics. 2) All students in a classroom would receive instruction in these subjects
together (e.g., no ability grouping). 3) Classroom layout would comprise free-standing desks
that seat two students.
The intervention assigned students to free-standing two-person desks via unconstrained
random partitioning within each classroom. We based the randomization on the class rosters
from the spring semester. Shortly before the start of the fall semester, we submitted the
randomized seating charts to teachers and teachers were instructed to use the charts for the
duration of the fall semester until January 2018. To account for changes to class rosters
during the summer via exits and entries, we instructed teachers to fill seats vacated by
exiting students with entering students from left to right, front to back, in alphabetic order
of entering students’ surnames. Since, (i) in expectation, students enter and exit classrooms
for the same reason (repeating grades and residential moves); and (ii) student surnames are
reasonably orthogonal to student grades, this replacement rule preserves randomization.
While teachers were expressly permitted to reseat students if they have to, we asked to
preserve the desk-mate composition wherever possible. We measured compliance through
teacher reports of the actual seating chart for September 15, 2017. The field team again
recorded the actual seating chart during school visits between October and December 2017
and verified classroom layouts through classroom photographs.
Schools and classrooms that do not meet our conditions are dropped from the study. To
date, we have dropped 133 classrooms for the following reasons: Withdrawal from the study
(25); Less than 10 students at baseline (8); split classrooms (10); Not free-standing desks
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that seat two students (30); Unreliable baseline reporting (7); Did not implement the seating
chart (40); Does not include information on Roma ethnicity (13). Based on these school-
and classroom-level exclusions, we anticipate an analysis sample of 3539 students across 182
classrooms of 38 schools.
Decision rules for dropping future observations: We will exclude students who are ran-
domly assigned to sit alone at a desk at baseline and who have missing values on our out-
comes.
Decision rules for dropping variables: If 95 percent or more of the sample answers the
same value on a variable we define this as limited variation. We will drop variables with
limited variation from the analysis.
Missing values: If we have missing values on variables we will code the variables as
zero and include dummy variables controlling for missing status so that we do not loose
observations. If more than 30 percent of the respondents do not answer a particular question,
it will no longer be seen as a main outcome variable.
3 Data and coding of main variables
We collect baseline variables via teacher reports. Outcome variables are collected via
a student survey at endline. In particular, we field a 45-minute two-part in-class survey
(see appendix). The first part (20 minutes) consists of a student questionnaire that elicits
self-reported grades for the spring and fall semester 2017, academic self-concept, and several
attitudinal measures. The second part of the endline survey consists of a reading compre-
hension test that is not used in this paper. Since the endline questionnaire contains a survey
experiment with two vignettes, we randomly sort questionnaires, using a random number
generator. Data collection will conclude in April of 2018. The research team will receive
outcomes data in May, 2018.
Treatment variables: We define our (exposure) treatment variable, Treatment as equal
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to 1 if a person is assigned a desk mate that is Roma and zero otherwise. We also have a
treatment variable in the survey experiment that we call Roma vignette, which is equal to
one if the vignette in question 9b includes the bold text saying that the classmate to lend
money is Roma (see below).
Primary and secondary outcome variables: We have 2 primary outcome variables: Roma
friend and Lend to Classmate.
Roma friend captures whether an individual has a Roma friend among his or her best
friends. The variable is from survey question 5d. Survey question 5 prompts: ”Now in
general think of your best friends, not just in the class but EVERYWHERE.”, and option
d is ”Among your best friends, how many are Roma (gypsy)?”. We code the variable as 1 if
the individual has at least one Roma friend and zero otherwise.
The variable Lend to Classmate is based on a survey experiment where students were
presented with a scenario where they could lend money to a classmate, survey question
9b. The survey question 9b builds on question 9a, which reads: ”Imagine that you are
going to the zoo with some of your classmates. Your desk mate (who you sat next to in
Hungarian class in December) has forgotten to bring money for the entrance ticket. You
have enough money for two entrance tickets. Would you lend your desk partner the money
for the entrance ticket?”. Question 9b then reads: ”Now imagine that it is not your desk
mate, but a different classmate who has forgotten to bring money with him/her. This
classmate is a Roma/Gypsy. Would you lend this Roma/Gypsy classmate the money
for the entrance ticket?” The bold text is only presented to a random half of the students.
The answer categories are Yes, No, I do not know. We will recode the variable to be 1 for
Yes and zero otherwise.
We have several secondary outcome variables. These variables will not necessarily be an-
alyzed as extensively nor by themselves be seen as confirmatory. Of special interest among
these are the variables Lend to Roma and Lend to non-Roma. These variables take the
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same values as the main variable, Lend to Classmate, but they are only defined for differ-
ent samples. Lend to Roma is only defined for individuals receiving the bold text in the
vignette and Lend to non-Roma is only defined when the vignette excludes the bold text.
For all classrooms that are majority non-Roma, a random classmate will be more likely to
be someone from the in-group for non-Roma respondents. Hence, if we restrict the sample
to majority non-Roma, the variables can be used to test whether close exposure to a Roma
desk mate affects both in out-group and in-group trust.
In addition to investigating the probability of having a Roma friend we will also investi-
gate effects on the Number of Roma friends, which just counts the number of Roma friends
in question 5d. We expect that we will get similar results with both variables.
Control variables: We only include control variables that are collected at baseline or stable
over time. The variables we include are age (in 0.1 years), gender and spring 2017 grades in
five core subjects (Hungarian literature, Hungarian grammar, mathematics, diligence, and
behavior). These variables are obtained from the classroom teacher.
Other variables: There are a set of questions that will be used for supplementary analyses.
Survey question 9a will be used to create a variable, Lend to Desk mate. We will also create
other variables such as Desk mate among best friends (to see if desk mate relations in general
are characterized by friendship potential) and Liked sitting next to desk mate.
Heterogeneity: The possibilities for heterogeneous treatment effects are endless. Both
characteristics of the exposed and the exposer are likely to matter. It is likely that people
that are similar to each other in other aspects have a higher likelihood of transmitting or
changing attitudes of the desk mate. With so many options, the heterogeneity analysis will
necessarily be seen as explorative. We here outline some of the aspects we will explore. We
will interact students’ own baseline GPA with Treatment in a model including GPA as well.
We will control for and interact a variable for whether the desk mates are of the same sex
or of different sex. At the contextual level there are also many possible moderators and we
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will investigate the moderating role of Share of Roma in class.
4 Empirical strategy
Identifying peer effects is difficult as people self-select into networks and since outcomes
are affected by correlated effects (Manski, 1993). With random variation in peer contact
we get around most of the challenges associated with identifying network effects. In order
to focus on the effect of exposure to a stigmatized minority group on the attitudes and
preferences of the majority population, we exclude the Roma students themselves from the
regressions.
We first estimate the following regression to identify the treatment effect on the proba-
bility to have a Roma friend:
(1) Romafriendict2 = βTreatedict1 + αClassct1 + γXict1 + εict2,
where i indexes individuals, c classes, and t is time (either baseline 1 or follow up 2).
Treatedict1 is a dummy equal to 1 if this person is assigned a Roma desk mate, Xict1 is
a set of individual level control variables either measured at baseline or reflecting stable
characteristics (described in section 3), and the error term, εict2. We will present results with
and without the baseline controls but the main specification is without controls. We use
robust standard errors in all estimations. The standard errors do not need to be clustered
at any level as the randomization is at the individual level (see Abadie et al., (2017)). The
class fixed effects are included as the randomization was conducted within classes.
The vector of individual level control variables is included as they may increase power.
To make the models fully saturated, we partition the covariate space and add these control
variables as indicator variables rather than using their multi-valued codings and we also
interact them with treatment (Athey and Imbens, 2017). We create an indicator for missing
values in the controls and include the missing indicator in the regressions in order not to
lose observations.
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The same specification is also run for Number of Roma friends as the outcome variable.
For our second main outcome variable we estimate the following regression:
(2) Lend to Classmateict2 = βTreatedict1 + θ Roma vignetteict2 + δTreatedict1*Roma
vignetteict2 + αClassct1 + γXict1 + εict2,
where we add the variables Roma vignette, which equals one if the bold text in the vignette
is included, and the interaction between Roma vignette and Treatment.
We also run the same specification without the interaction term and without Roma
vignette separately for Lend to Roma and Lend to non-Roma and for a sample restricted to
non-Roma majority. In the analysis of lending to Roma we will also investigate whether it
makes a difference whether or not the person lent to his or her desk mate.
To explore heterogeneity we will first interact the treatment variable with the baseline
control variables (Gender and baseline grades). We will also test whether the effect is different
in classes with relatively many and relatively few Roma by interacting treatment with Share
of Roma in class. The standard errors will then be clustered at the class level.
We will also use machine learning techniques to automate the search for heterogenous
treatment effects. There are many different types of machine learning algorithms and we
have have decided to use classification and regression trees (R package causalTree, (Athey
and Imbens, 2016)); and random forests (R package grf, (Wager and Athey, 2017)). As this
field is moving rapidly, however, it is possible that there will be other techniques that are
relevant for us once we start analyzing the data.
Balance tests: To test for balance we will regress our main treatment variable on the
control variables described above both individually and together, while controlling for class
fixed effects. We will judge whether the randomization worked by conducting an F-test of
whether the control variables jointly predict treatment status.
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5 Hypotheses
In the literature on interethnic exposure there are, broadly speaking, two perspectives
on the effects of diversity. One perspective argues that diversity leads to negative outcomes.
Several empirical studies find patterns that are consistent with what is denoted conflict
theory; diversity is associated with e.g. less trust (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Delhey
and Newton, 2005; Dinesen and Sønderskov, 2015; Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston, 2008). The
other perspective is more positive. Contact theory (Allport, 1954) suggests that personal
contact with members of out-groups can reduce prejudice and misperceptions, and thereby
increase trust. There is ample evidence from well identified studies using random assignment,
either of students (e.g. Boisjoly et al., 2006; Burns, Corno, and La Ferrara, 2016) or within
the military (Carrell, Hoekstra, and West, 2015; Finseraas and Kotsadam, 2017b; Finseraas
et al., 2016), showing that personal contact reduces prejudice and strengthens cooperation
(Goette, Huffman, and Meier, 2006).
According to contact theory, the positive effects of personal contact are expected to apply
when certain criteria are met (Allport, 1954). The contact should take place in a context
with equal status, shared common goals, be cooperative, and take place under some form
of authority (Pettigrew, 1998). Finally, the setting should have friendship potential, which
increases the probability of affective ties and willingness to learn about out-group members
(Van Laar et al., 2005). In fact, several authors argue that friendship potential is the most
essential condition (Laurence, 2009; Pettigrew, 1998; Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston, 2008).
Contact theory has received support in several field experiments with randomly assigned
contact (e.g. Boisjoly et al., (2006), Burns, Corno, and La Ferrara, (2016), Carrell, Hoekstra,
and West, (2015), Finseraas and Kotsadam, (2017b), and Finseraas et al., (2016)) but most
of the evidence is based on correlational patterns (see Brown and Hewstone, (2005) and
Pettigrew et al., (2011), and Paluck, Green, and Green, (2017) for reviews).
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Our first main hypothesis is that being randomly assigned to a Roma desk mate increases
the probability of having a Roma as one of the best friends. The reasons for this are that
induced homophily is larger and that contact theory is likely to operate at this very personal
level. The hypothesis will be seen as confirmed if β is positive and statistically significant in
equation 1.
Our second main hypothesis is that being randomly assigned to a Roma desk mate in-
creases the relative probability of wanting to lend money to a Roma classmate rather than
a random classmate. The reasons for this is that contact theory is likely to operate at this
level and that we expect friendship ties (as in the hypothesis above). The hypothesis will be
seen as confirmed if δ is positive and statistically significant in equation 2.
The second hypothesis is thereby tested by a difference in difference model. The estimate
gives us the differential effect of contact on sending money to a classmate when being given
the Roma vignette. The coefficients for Treatment and for Roma vignette will also be inter-
esting to investigate. In particular in classes that are majority non-Roma, as the coefficient
for Treatment will then show if having a Roma desk mate affects in group trust. Following
constrict theory, exposure to ethnic diversity will lead to lower trust towards the in-group as
well. However, trust may increase also to the in-group by being exposed to people that were
mistakenly thought of as less trustworthy before contact (see Finseraas et al. 2018 for a sim-
ilar reasoning). The coefficient for Roma vignette will tell us the difference in willingness to
lend to a Roma classmate for individuals not exposed to a Roma desk mate. As outlined in
the empirical strategy, we will also investigate these aspects by running separate regressions
of Lend to Roma and Lend to non-Roma on Treatment for a sample of non-Roma majority.
As conflict and contact theories envisages different types of interactions between the
majority and minority individuals, they may both be correct at the same time. Many contri-
butions highlight this fact (e.g. Abascal and Baldassarri, (2015), Dinesen and Sønderskov,
(2015), and Valdez, (2014)) and already Allport (1954) argued that shallow exposure may
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increase rather than decrease antipathy towards minorities. Furthermore, a series of con-
tributions argue that contact may diminish or even reverse the negative effects of exposure
(Laurence, 2009; McLaren, 2003; Schneider, 2008; Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston, 2008; Us-
laner, 2012). The argument is that the threatening aspects of exposure are mitigated by
contact or that social interactions changes the very conception of whom is considered to
be in the in-group (McLaren, 2003; Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston, 2008). The empirical
evidence for these claims is exclusively based on correlations whereby individuals self-select
into having contact with or being friends with minorities.
We use our data to contrast and combine the conflict and contact perspective on ethnic
diversity, by studying treatment heterogeneity according to previous exposure to diversity.
We do not have random variation in the exposure to Roma at other levels of analyses but
we will explore whether close personal exposure has a different impact in classes with more
or less Roma. As this analysis is explorative we remain agnostic as to the direction of the
heterogeneity in the effect. We also expect that there may be heterogeneity in the effects
based on whom is exposed and based on qualities of the Roma child the person is exposed
to. We will investigate this exploratively and we think that grades and gender may be
important moderators. In an observational study, Hajdu, Kertesi, and Kezdi, (2017b) find
that academically high achieving Roma students have more interethnic friendships. Other
heterogeneity analyses are outlined in section 3.
6 Power calculation
In testing our different hypotheses we are restricting the sample to non-Roma individ-
uals. For the test of the difference in difference model we will furthermore base the power
calculation on half of the sample as only a random half is assigned the Roma version of the
vignette.
We also adjust the p-values for the fact that we are testing two hypotheses. We follow the
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recommendations of Fink, McConnell, and Vollmer, (2014) and use a method developed by
Benjamini and Hochberg, (1995) and Benjamini and Yekutieli, (2001) to minimize the false
non-discovery rate (see also Almeida, (2012) and Finseraas and Kotsadam, (2017b) for pre-
analysis plans with the same decision rules for correction of p-values). The main advantage
of the method is that it is limiting the risk of false discoveries while only adjusting the
critical values based on other true hypotheses. The false discovery rate method developed
by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) implies that the m p-values of the i hypotheses are
ordered from low to high and that the critical value of the p-value is then p(i) = a*i/m. In
our case, with 2 hypotheses and a significance level (a) of 0.05, the critical p-value would
be 0.025 for the one with the lowest p-value (0.05* 1/2, which is the same as a Bonferroni
correction). For the second hypothesis, the critical p-value is 0.05 (0.05*2/2).
Conservatively, we expect to have a sample of at least 2000 non-Roma individuals in
our samples. We calculate power using the program optimal design and if we use the most
conservative p-value of 0.025 we have a minimum detectable effect (MDE) of 0.14 for the
Roma friend hypothesis. For the second hypothesis, wanting to lend money to a Roma
classmate, we only have half as many people in each cell since it is based on an interaction
term. Our calculated MDE for this hypothesis with the most conservative p-value of 0.025
is 0.2. We therefore think that our study is well powered to detect relatively small effects.
7 IRB approval and consent
This study was reviewed and approved by the IRB offices at the Hungarian Academy
of Science (data collection and analysis); and at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (data
analysis). We obtained consent at multiple points. First, we asked school administrators
and teachers to consent to participate in the study. Second, we had the teachers ask the
parents to consent to data collection about their children.
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8 Archive
The pre-analysis plan is archived before any endline data is received. We archive it at
the registry for randomized controlled trials in economics held by The American Economic
Association: https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/ on March 22 2018. We will receive the
endline data in May 2018.
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General Information about the Exercises 
 
Please read the following information carefully, and then start answering the questions in the 
notebook! 
The test notebook consists of two parts. 
In Part 1, we ask questions about you, or rather we are interested in your opinions. Here it is 
important for us that we get to know what you think. 
In the test notebook’s second part you will find comprehension exercises. Please read the 
assignments carefully, and answer the questions to the best of your knowledge! 
Start doing the exercises from the beginning of the notebook! (i.e. start at the beginning?) 










Please make sure that you only mark one answer for each question! 
 
If you have already marked an answer, but then change your mind, clearly cross out the first mark 



















   








































































1. What grades did you receive at the END OF LAST SEMESTER in the following? Think of the report card 




Mark the appropriate number in each row! Only shade in one circle! 
 
1 2 3 4 5 I don’t remember 
a) Behaviour - - - - - 
1   
- - - 
2
- - - - 
3   
- - - 
4   
- - - 
5 6
 
b) Diligence- - - - - - 
1   
- - - 
2
- - - - 
3   
- - - 
4   
- - - 
5 6
 
c) Hungarian Language- 
1   
- - - 
2
- - - - 
3   
- - - 
4   
- - - 
5 6
 
d) Literature - - - - - - - 
1   
- - - 
2
- - - - 
3   
- - - 
4   
- - - 
5 6
 
e) Mathematics - - - - - 
1   
- - - 
2
- - - - 
3   
- - - 
4   





2. What grades did you get at the END OF LAST SCHOOL YEAR in the following?  Think of the report 
card you received last summer in June. 
 
 
Mark the appropriate number in each row! Only shade in one circle! 
 
1 2 3 4 5 I don’t remember 
a) Behaviour - - - - - 
1   
- - - 
2
- - - - 
3   
- - - 
4   
- - - 
5 6
 
b) Diligence - - - - - - 
1   
- - - 
2
- - - - 
3   
- - - 
4   
- - - 
5 6
 
c) Hungarian Language- 
1   
- - - 
2
- - - - 
3   
- - - 
4   
- - - 
5 6
 
d) Literature - - - - - - - 
1   
- - - 
2
- - - - 
3   
- - - 
4   
- - - 
5 6
 
e) Mathematics - - - - - 
1   
- - - 
2
- - - - 
3   
- - - 
4   
- - - 
5 6
 
3. How much do you like the following subjects? 
 Mark the appropriate number in each row! Only shade in one circle! 
 
a) Hungarian Language- - - - - 
1    
- - - - - - 
2    
- - - - - - 
3    
- - - - - 
4    
- - - - - - 
5 6
 
b) Literature - - - - - - - - - - - 
1    
- - - - - - 
2    
- - - - - - 
3    
- - - - - 
4    
- - - - - - 
5 6
 
c) Mathematics - - - - - - - - - 
1    
- - - - - - 
2    
- - - - - - 
3    
- - - - - 
4    
















Really Don’t Neutral Like Really Don’t know 
Don’t like Like   Like  
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4.  Please think of your best friends in your class. In the table below, write down who your 5 best 
friends are in the class 
 
 
If you have fewer than 5 friends in your class, then write fewer names in the table. Be sure to write your friends’ full names into 
the table, in other words both their family names and their Christian/given names. Do not use your friends’ nicknames! Ask for your 




Christian/given name (write in all Christian/given 














5. Now in general think of your best friends, not just in the class but EVERYWHERE. 
 







6. Now think of that desk partner who you sat next to in December in Hungarian class. Write 
down the full name of this desk partner! 
 
 








7. How much did you like sitting next to your desk partner? 
 
Mark the corresponding number! Only shade in one circle! 
 
Really            Did not Neutral Liked Really Don’t know Did not have 
adtár- Did not like          like   liked  A desk partner in December 
1 
- - - - - - - 
2  
- - - - - - - 
3 
- - - - - - - 
4  
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 Please write in the appropriate number to the question! 
a) In total how many best friends do you have? 
 
b) Among your best friends, how many are boys? 
 
c) Among your best friends, how many are girls? 
 
d) Among your best friends, how many are roma (gypsy)? 
 
 







8. Think of Hungarian language, literature and mathematics . The following questions relate to how good 
you think you are in these subjects. 
 
 
In each row mark the number you consider to be true! Only shade in one circle in each row! 
 
Let’s start with HUNGARIAN LANGUAGE! 
In your opinion how good are you at Hungarian language? 
I am  I am  I am  I don’t 
very bad at average at  very good at know 
Hungarian  Hungarian  Hungarian  
1    
- - - - - 
2
- - - - - - 
3    
- - - - - 
4  
- - - - - - 
5    
- - - - - 
6  




Compared to your classmates how good are you at Hungarian language? 
In the class I am  In the class In the class I am I don’t 
among the worst at I am average at among the best at know 
 Hungarian Hungarian Hungarian  
1    
- - - - - 
2
- - - - - - 
3    
- - - - - 
4  
- - - - - - 
5    
- - - - - 
6  




Compared to your other subjects how good are you at Hungarian language? 
I am much worse at  I am as good at  I am much better at I don’t 
Hungarian than at Hungarian as at the Hungarian than at know 
 other subjects other subjects other subjects  
1    
- - - - - 
2
- - - - - - 
3    
- - - - - 
4  
- - - - - - 
5    
- - - - - 
6  




Now think of LITERATURE! 
In your opinion how good are you at literature? 
I am I am  I am       I don’t 
very bad at average at Very good at know 
literature literature literature  
1    
- - - - - 
2
- - - - - - 
3    
- - - - - 
4  
- - - - - - 
5    
- - - - - 
6  




Compared to your classmates how good are you at literature? 
In the class I am In the class I am In the class I am I don’t 
among the worst at  average at among the best at know 
literature literature literature  
1    
- - - - - 
2
- - - - - - 
3    
- - - - - 
4  
- - - - - - 
5    
- - - - - 
6  




Compared to your other subjects how good are you at literature? 
I am much worse at I am as good at I am much better at I don’t 
literature than at  literature as at literature than at know 
other subjects other subjects Other subjects  
1    
- - - - - 
2
- - - - - - 
3    
- - - - - 
4  
- - - - - - 
5    
- - - - - 
6  
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Finally, think of MATHEMATICS! 
In your opinion how good are you at mathematics? 
I am  I am  I am  I don’t 
very bad at  average at  very good at know 
mathematics mathematics mathematics  
1    
- - - - - 
2
- - - - - - 
3    
- - - - - 
4  
- - - - - - 
5    
- - - - - 
6  




Compared to your classmates how good are you at mathematics? 
In the class I am  In the class I am  In the class I am I don’t 
among the worst at average at  among the best know 
mathematics mathematics at mathematics  
1    
- - - - - 
2
- - - - - - 
3    
- - - - - 
4  
- - - - - - 
5    
- - - - - 
6  




 Compared to your other subjects how good are you at mathematics? 
I am much worse at  I am as good at  I am much better at I don’t 
mathematics than at mathematics as I am at Mathematics than at  know 
other subjects the other subjects Other subjects  
1    
- - - - - 
2
- - - - - - 
3    
- - - - - 
4  
- - - - - - 
5    
- - - - - 
6  





9. Imagine that you are going to the zoo with some of your classmates. Your desk partner (who you sat next to 
in Hungarian class in December) has forgotten to bring money for the entrance ticket. You have enough 
money for two entrance tickets. Would you lend your desk partner the money for the entrance ticket? 
 
 







c) I don’t know
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
 
d) I didn’t have a desk partner in Hungarian class December
-- 4
 
Now imagine that it is not your desk partner, but a different class mate who has forgotten to bring money with 
him/her. This classmate is a Roma/Gypsy [This sentence is missing in Version B]. Would you lend this 
Roma/Gypsy [Roma/Gypsy omitted from Version B]classmate the money for the entrance ticket? [i.e. 
Version B makes no mention of Roma/Gypsy otherwise it is the same] 
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10. Now think about how good the boys and how good the girls are at Hungarian language, literature, and 
mathematics. In your opinion when it comes to Hungarian language, to literature and to mathematics, are 
the boys better, or are the girls better, or are they equally good? 
 
 























better than the 
boys 
a) Hungarian - - - - - - - 
1  
- - - - - - - - - - 
2    
- - - - - - - - - 
3  
- - - - - - - - 
4 ---------------------------------------- 5
 
b) Literature - - - - - - - - - - 
1  
- - - - - - - - - - 
2    
- - - - - - - - - 
3  
- - - - - - - - 
4 ---------------------------------------- 5
 
c) Mathematics - - - - - - - - 
1  
- - - - - - - - - - 
2    
- - - - - - - - - 
3  
- - - - - - - - 
4 ---------------------------------------- 5
 
11. Now think of the classmate of yours whom you consider to be the cleverest. Is this classmate a boy or a girl? 







c) I can’t say who is the cleverest
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------3
 
12. Now think of an assignment that a group of children must solve/do together. What do you think, which group 
would be able to do this assignment better? 
Shade just one circle in! 
a) A group only of boys
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
 
b) A group only of girls
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
 
c) A group with both boys and girls in it - - 
3
 




   
The following questions (13 & 14) are administered in Grades 6-8 only 
  
  Q13 for 6th and 7th grade [not translated yet] 
 
  [Q13 in 8th grade] 
13. Please indicate whether  or not you applied to grammar school in February 2018! If you applied to several 
high schools were any of these grammar schools? 
Only shade one answer! 
a) Yes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
1 
b) No - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
2 















[Q14 in 6th-8th grade] 
14. Regardless of whether you did or did not apply to grammar school, do you think you would/will be accepted? 
0 means that they would definitely not accept you. 10 means that they would definitely accept you. You can also use numbers 
between 0 and 10 where the larger the number you circle the more certain you are that they will/would accept you. Only shade one 
answer! 
Definitely will not          Definitely 
Accept me          Will 
accept me 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Please continue on to the comprehension exercises!  
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